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In 1978, Louise Brown, the first baby conceived through in vitro fertilization 
(IVF),1 changed the world. Doctors first considered fertilization outside a woman’s 
body in 1934,2 and it has since become a medical mainstay.3 Since 1978, around 
five million children worldwide have been born through assisted reproductive 
technology (ART).4 In IVF, eggs are retrieved from a woman’s ovaries and 
fertilized in a lab. The resulting embryos are transferred into the uterus of either the 
woman who produced the eggs or of another woman.5 This procedure has had 
drastic implications on the law of surrogacy contracts.6  
Surrogacy provides a pathway to genetic parenthood for people who cannot 
achieve a successful pregnancy on their own.7 A surrogate 
is a woman who, for financial and/or compassionate reasons, agrees to 
bear a child for another woman who is incapable or, less often, 
unwilling to do so herself . . . she is a substitute or tentative mother in 
that she conceives, gestates and delivers a baby on behalf of another 
woman who is subsequently seen as the real mother of the child.8 
Intended parents, the surrogate, and sometimes the surrogate’s husband enter a 
contract that dictates the parameters of the surrogacy.9 Typical intended parents are 
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 1. SUSAN L. CROCKIN & HOWARD W. JONES, JR., LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: THE EVOLVING 
LAW AND POLICY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2010).  
 2. Timeline: The History of In Vitro Fertilization, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
americanexperience/features/timeline/babies. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Eliana Dockterman, Reproductive Medicine’s Gift: 5 Million Babies, TIME (Oct. 16, 
2013), http://healthland.time.com/2013/10/16/reproductive-medicines-gift-5-million-babies/. 
In fact, 2.5 million of these babies have been born in the past six years alone. Id. 
 5. See Austin Caster, Don’t Split the Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and 
Unnecessary Litigation and Promote Equality by Emulating the British Surrogacy Law 
Regime, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 477, 481 (2011). 
 6. While surrogacy raises complex concerns, such as commercialization, 
commodification, and the right to procreate (to name a few), these issues have been 
thoroughly examined elsewhere. Devising overarching conclusions about surrogacy’s 
societal impact is outside the purview of this Note. 
 7. Richard J. Arneson, Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy, 21 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 132, 145 (1992). In many cases, the resulting children are only related to their intended 
father. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 257 n.30 (1994). 
 8. Anton van Niekerk & Liezl van Zyl, The Ethics of Surrogacy: Women’s 
Reproductive Labour, 21 J. MED. ETHICS 345, 345 (1995) (internal quotations and 
parentheticals omitted).  
 9. See Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An 
Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 22 (2005). 
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Caucasian, heterosexual, married, and financially secure.10 They want a genetic 
connection to their children, so they pursue surrogacy.11 Surrogates are often 
married mothers in their twenties or thirties who are white, Christian, and working 
class.12 Surrogacy agencies often screen potential applicants to prevent 
exploitation.13 
Prior to the widespread acceptance and use of IVF, ART became “more familiar 
and, with familiarity, . . . seemed less threatening” over time.14 Originally, when 
parties entered a surrogacy contract, the intended surrogate would be inseminated 
by the intended father’s sperm. She would be the biological and birth mother of any 
resulting child. This is referred to as traditional surrogacy.15 This genetic 
connection, as highlighted in the Baby M case,16 prompted New York and other 
states to ban commercial surrogacy contracts, lest parent-child ties be coercively or 
hastily severed.17  
In gestational surrogacy, the surrogate is the “oven” for another woman’s 
“bun,” so there is no genetic connection between the carrier and child.18 The 
growing standardization and acceptance19 of IVF allows the gestational carrier to 
be just that—the carrier.20 Here, the intended mother is often the child’s21 genetic 
                                                                                                             
 
 10. See id. at 35. It is not surprising that most intended parents are financially secure; in 
2005, the average cost to intended parents for a surrogacy arrangement ranged from $25,000 
to $100,000. Id. at 36. 
 11. Id. at 35.  
 12. Id. at 31. Surrogates used by the Center for Surrogate Parenting (one of the most 
respected surrogacy agencies) are typically middle class, married with two or three 
biological children, Christian, working class, often employed part-time, have some college 
education, but not a degree, and live in suburbs or small towns. Leslie Morgan Steiner, Who 
Becomes a Surrogate?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
health/archive/2013/11/who-becomes-a-surrogate/281596/. Nationally, they tend to have 
household incomes of less than $60,000. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Elizabeth S. Scott, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange: 
Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 137 
(2009). 
 15. See, e.g., Brittnay M. McMahon, The Science Behind Surrogacy: Why New York 
Should Rethink Its Surrogacy Contracts Laws, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 359, 361 (2011).  
 16. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988) 
 17. McMahon, supra note 15, at 362. 
 18. McMahon, supra note 15 at 363. The use of donor eggs has increased over time. In 
1996, 2000 IVF cycles used donated eggs; this figure increased to over 17,000 in 2000 in the 
United States. Susan Golombok, Jennifer Readings, Lucy Blake, Polly Casey, Alex Marks, 
& Vasanti Jadva, Families Created Through Surrogacy: Mother-Child Relationships and 
Children’s Psychological Adjustment at Age 7, 47(6) DEV. PSYCH. 1579 (2011). Further, the 
use of donor eggs has continued to increase. Lindsey Tanner, Donor Egg Pregnancies on the 
Rise, US Study Finds, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 17, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/donor-egg-
pregnancies-rise-us-study-finds-135419857.html;_ylt=A2KJ3CS5.35SRDIAGfbQtDMD. 
 19. Scott, supra note 14, at 137–38. 
 20. “[S]urrogate mothers do not generally indicate that the babies belong to them; 
rather, they feel they are providing a meaningful and valuable service for the intended 
parents.” Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Roundtable on Regulating Assisted Reproductive 
Technology 2012: Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy 88 IND. L.J. 
1223, 1230 (2013). This is particularly true with regards to gestational surrogates, who lack 
a genetic relationship to the children. Id. at 1231. Interestingly, there is no medical “evidence 
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mother, or, when an intended mother cannot produce ova, donor eggs can be used. 
Even though the surrogate gestates the fetus, the removal of this biological 
connection should sever the surrogate’s legal parental rights.22 
Infertile couples’ reliance on surrogacy has increased over time,23 yet the law 
has not kept up with technology and parental desires.24 As reliance increases, 
variations on the basic surrogacy model become more complex.25 Parties may 
increasingly swap their genetic material out for gametes from persons outside the 
surrogacy agreement. For example, a surrogacy arrangement could involve five 
“parents”: genetic mother (egg donor), surrogate, intended mother, genetic father 
(sperm donor), and intended father.26 Many states, including New York, take an 
outdated approach to surrogacy contracts and thus create ineffective protections for 
intended parents and surrogates.27 Surrogacy is at the center of legislative and 
policy debates; the time is ripe for reexamination of state surrogacy law in light of 
changes to technology and desire for access to these developments.28 Other states 
                                                                                                             
of a biological basis for bonding” during gestation. STEINBOCK, supra note 1, at 209. In fact, 
the gestational surrogates themselves “heavily emphasize genetics.” Laufer-Ukeles, supra at 
1231. Contra Radhika Rao, Hierarchies of Discrimination in Baby Making?: A Response to 
Professor Carroll, 88 Ind. L.J. 1217, 1221 (2013) (decrying "unthinking stereotypes and 
prejudices that endow genes with greater significance than other biological connections and 
envision a gestational surrogate as a mere 'carrier' and not the real mother."). 
 21. For the ease of communication in this Note, the singular “child” generally denotes 
the plural “children.” 
 22. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (where no biological link between 
carrier and fetus, there is no bond and no parental rights should attach); McMahon, supra 
note 15, at 636. 
 23. Golombok, supra note 18, at 1579. By the middle of 1992, approximately 4000 
children had been born through surrogacy agreements across the United States. Kevin Sack, 
New York Is Urged to Outlaw Surrogate Parenting for Pay, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1992, at 
B5. At least 1600 children were born through the use of a gestational surrogate between 
1991 and 1999. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 23. The CDC began requiring 
reporting on the success of IVF cycles in 1992, but did not require separate reporting for 
gestational surrogacy until 2003, so it is likely more children were born through gestational 
surrogacy than this number reflects. Id. In the United States, between 2004 and 2008, the 
number of babies born through gestational surrogacy increased eighty-nine percent. 
MAGDALINA GUGUCHEVA, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY IN AMERICA 3 
(2010), available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/ 
kaevej0a1m.pdf. Between 2007 and 2012, the use of gestational surrogates increased by 
twenty-eight percent. Susan K. Livio, Christie Vetoes Bill that Would Have Eased Tough 
Rules for Gestational Surrogates, NJ.COM (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.nj.com/politics/ 
index.ssf/2012/08/christie_vetoes_bill_that_woul.html. 
 24. See CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 374, 384. 
 25. Id. at 384. 
 26. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 99 (1995). In most cases, the egg and sperm 
donors have waived their rights at gamete retrieval. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 
(West 2013) (requiring gamete or embryo donor relinquish parental rights to resulting 
children unless partaking in an adoption or surrogacy arrangement). Contra N.Y. TASK 
FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (2011) [hereinafter 
TASK FORCE], available at http://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/reports_ 
publications/execsum.htm. 
 27. See TASK FORCE, supra note 26. 
 28. See Judy Callman, Surrogacy – A Case for Normalization, 14 HUM. REPROD. 277 
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have seized this opportunity to amend their regulatory regimes; it is time for New 
York to follow suit and do the same. 
This Note will place recent New York proposals to reform the prohibitory 
surrogacy law regime in larger contexts, both nationally and state-specifically.29 
Part I provides an overview of the surrogacy regimes across the United States and 
examines a few recent proposals. Part II provides a historical discussion of New 
York’s prohibitions. Part III describes the proposals to liberalize the state’s 
surrogacy regime. Part IV recommends improvements to these and future 
legislative proposals.30 Approval of reform legislation would acknowledge 
developments in ART and bring law into alignment with intended parents’ desires.  
 
I. AMERICAN REGULATION OF SURROGACY 
 
The beauty of federalism is that states can take different approaches to a single 
issue. “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”31  
This is clear regarding surrogacy regulations: the different approaches form a 
continuum—from absolute prohibition, to moderate regulation, to approval. Even 
within this continuum, approaches vary. There are also some states that eschew 
legislation, relying solely on common law. 
States that permit surrogacy have adopted diverse regulatory mechanisms. Some 
states distinguish between traditional and gestational surrogacy;32 some distinguish 
between commercial and altruistic surrogacy;33 some provide surrogacy as an 
option only for married couples;34 some permit surrogacy only where it is 
medically indicated.35  
                                                                                                             
(1999). In the past two years Arizona, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Louisiana, 
Maryland, New Jersey, and South Dakota, in addition to New York, have all considered 
revisions to their surrogacy law regimes. See H.B. 2081, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2013); 79 Del. Laws 88 (2013); B2-0032, 2013–2014 Council, 20th Period (D.C. 2013); 
H.B. 433, 2013 Reg. Sess. (La. 2013); H.B. 1099, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013); S.B. 1599, 
215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012); S.B. 2032, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(b) (N.J. 2013); 
H.B. 1218, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2011); H.B. 1255, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012); 
H.B. 1094, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2013). 
 29. Seeing as this is the Indiana Law Journal Supplement, I’d be remiss to not address 
Indiana specifically. In 1997, Indiana’s legislature added Sections 31-20-1-1 and -2 
declaring that surrogacy agreements were against public policy and that those entered after 
March 14, 1988 are void. Recently, Indiana has not attempted to change its policy on 
surrogacy. New York provides a more interesting case study.  
 30. Since drafts of the legislation are substantively the same, this evaluation will be 
done together. 
 31. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 32. For example, Illinois only permits gestational surrogacy contracts to be enforceable. 
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2006). 
 33. For example, Washington only prohibits commercial surrogacy; it is the 
compensation to which the state objects as violative of public policy. WASH. REV. CODE. 
§26-26-240 (2013). Similarly, Nebraska, while proclaiming surrogacy contracts “void and 
unenforceable,” only prohibits commercial surrogacy, as it defines “surrogate parenthood 
contracts” as contracts “by which a woman is to be compensated for bearing a child of a man 
who is not her husband.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (2013). 
 34. For example, Nevada, while providing that the intended parents “be treated in law as 
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An absolute prohibition on surrogacy contracts outlaws the creation and 
prevents enforcement of traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts. There are 
presently five states that completely ban surrogacy: New York, North Dakota, 
Michigan, Indiana, and Arizona.36 These states proclaim that surrogacy contracts 
violate public policy.37  
Below is a brief description of some recent attempts to change state surrogacy 
regimes. 
 
A. Recent Proposals 
 
New York was not the only state whose legislature recently considered 
proposals attempting to repeal or revise surrogacy prohibitions. New Jersey, 
Maryland, and South Dakota are some of the jurisdictions that recently considered 
revisions to their surrogacy laws, while Delaware successfully amended its 
surrogacy regime.38 
 
1. New Jersey 
 
In 2012, the New Jersey legislature considered two bills regarding surrogacy 
contracts. The first recognized and enforced gestational surrogacy agreements 
because they were “in accord with the public policy of [the] State.”39 In response, 
opponents introduced another bill, asserting that surrogacy contracts were “in direct 
conflict with numerous public policies of the State.”40 This bill included criminal 
penalties for those involved in the arrangement or execution of a surrogacy 
contract, including doctors and brokers, as well as to those who sought or offered to 
pay a surrogate.41 Intended parents who entered noncommercial surrogacy 
contracts could receive severe civil penalties.42 The surrogate herself would be 
subject to civil penalties, unless she showed a “genuine willingness” to accept the 
resulting child and she “repudiate[d] the agreement in writing within 120 days” of 
the child’s birth.43 The birthmother would have a presumption of primary 
                                                                                                             
. . . natural parent[s] under all circumstances,” NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045(2) (2013), 
limits who may enter into a valid surrogacy contract; Nevada limits the intended parents to 
persons “whose marriage is valid” in Nevada and who provide the “egg and sperm” for the 
“assisted conception.” Id. § 126.045(1), (4). 
 35. For example, Illinois requires at least one of the intended parents “have a medical 
need for the gestational surrogacy as evidenced by a qualified physician’s affidavit.” 750 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2006); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2013) (requiring an 
intended mother be unable to safely carry a pregnancy to term); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
160(B)(8) (2010) (requiring that the intended mother be unable to bear a child).  
 36. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (2013); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS §§ 722.853, 722.855, 722.857 (2013); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 122, 123, 124 
(2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2013). 
 37. See IND. CODE. § 31-20-1-1 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (2013). 
 38. See supra note 28. 
 39. S.B. 1599, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(a) (N.J. 2012). 
 40. S.B. 2032, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(b) (N.J. 2013). 
 41. Id. §§ 3, 4. 
 42. The penalty for a first offense would range from $30,000 to $50,000; those penalties 
would jump to between $50,000 and $80,000 for a second offense. Id. § 4. 
 43. The penalties range from $10,000 to $70,000, depending on how many times she 
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permanent custody (barring risk of harm to the child) with the intended parents 
possibly receiving “parenting time.”44  
Ultimately, although the legislature had approved liberalization of the surrogacy 
laws that would have given custody to the intended parents at birth, eliminated the 
three-day wait period between birth and the intended parents being listed on the 
birth certificate,45 and provided a comprehensive scheme of enforcement,46 
Governor Christie vetoed the bill. He explained that allowing surrogacy contracts 
“unquestionably raises serious and significant issues” and the legislature had not 
examined the effect on the traditional family extensively enough.47 After the veto, 




Maryland’s Collaborative Reproduction Act49 was introduced to standardize the 
state’s surrogacy laws and to provide protections for intended parents and 
surrogates. It would permit enforcement of surrogacy contracts that conformed to 
its required standards.50  
The Act set out eligibility requirements for surrogates and intended parents. The 
most notable requirements for surrogates are that they must have been approved by 
a mental health professional and a reproductive endocrinologist51 and they must 
have had at least one live child.52 Similarly, intended parents would need prior 
approval after medical and psychological evaluation53 and “have guaranteed 
payment” of all expenses to be able to participate in a surrogacy arrangement.54  
The Act also set out procedural55 and substantive requirements for the contract. 
The gestational carrier and her partner must agree to follow medical advice,56 
surrender custody of the child at birth,57 aid the intended parents in getting 
custody,58 comply with other negotiated terms in the contract,59 and disclaim legal 
                                                                                                             
had committed the offense. Id. § 5. 
 44. Id. §§ 6, 7.  
 45. Id.  
 46. N.J. S.B. 1599. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Livio, supra, note 23.  
 49. H.B. 1099, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013). 
 50. Id. § 5-905. 
 51. Id. § 5-906(A)(1)(III)–(IV). 
 52. Id. § 5-906(A)(1)(II). Otherwise, surrogates must be at least twenty-one, id. § 5-
906(A)(1)(I); and be independently represented, id. § 5-906(A)(1)(V). The Act would permit 
intended parents to pay legal fees. Id. § 5-906(A)(2). 
 53. Id. § 5-906(B)(2)–(3). 
 54. Id. § 5-906(B)(5). The Act would permit a variety of ways of paying expenses. Id. 
Further, the proposal would require allocation of expenses if the contract or pregnancy was 
terminated. Id. Intended parents also must be independently represented. Id. § 5-906(B)(4). 
 55. The contract must be in writing, notarized, and signed before embryo transfer. Id. § 
5-907(A)(1). If not notarized, the signatures must be otherwise verified. Id. The surrogate, 
her husband and the intended parents all must sign. Id. 
 56. Id. § 5-907(B)(1)(I). 
 57. Id. § 5-907(B)(1)(III). 
 58. Id. § 5-907(B)(1)(IV). 
 59. Id. § 5-907(B)(V). 
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custody of the child.60 The intended parents must agree to accept the child at birth 
regardless of its condition.61 The Act would require reimbursement of “reasonable 
medical and ancillary expenses,” but prohibit other payments.62 Like other 
legislative proposals, in case of dispute, Maryland’s would prohibit specific 
performance if it would require impregnating the surrogate.63  
The proposal would permit petitions for parentage to be filed at any time after 
pregnancy is achieved.64 If the petition is sufficient, the court would establish 
parentage65 and require a birth certificate to reflect the child’s legal parentage.66 
Unlike most other regulations of surrogacy, Maryland’s proposal would only seal 
the proceedings at the request of the intended parents.67 At the end of the legislative 
session, the Collaborative Reproduction Act remained stalled in a Maryland House 
Committee.68  
 
3. South Dakota 
 
South Dakota’s recent history with surrogacy is one of contradictory attempts 
but no success. In 2011 and 2012, legislation was proposed to prevent enforcement 
of surrogacy contracts.69 In 2013, competing legislation was proposed to enforce 
certain surrogacy contracts.70 To date, none of the bills have been approved. 
The 2011 bill defined surrogacy broadly71 and declared it violative of public 
policies. It proposed severe penalties for surrogacy participants.72 Further, the 
                                                                                                             
 
 60. Id. § 5-907(B)(II). 
 61. Id. § 5-907(B)(2). This would include “paying for any funeral expenses if there is a 
stillbirth, preterm birth, or any other birth issue that results in the child’s death.” Id. § 5-
907(B)(2)(II). 
 62. Id. § 5-901(P). The ancillary expenses could include “expenses for maternity 
clothes, legal and counseling expenses, actual lost wages, child care expenses, housekeeping 
expenses, intangible expenses associated with risk, inconvenience, forbearance, or restriction 
from usual activities, postpartum recover expenses, and travel expenses” related to the 
agreement. Id. § 5-907(C)(1). Expenses are presumed to be reasonable if specified in the 
contract and the contract was negotiated by attorneys. Id. § 5-907(C)(2)–(3). 
 63. Id. § 5-910(C)(1). However, the proposal would permit specific performance if the 
surrogate refused to relinquish the child, if the intended parents failed to take custody or if a 
party failed to cooperate in proceedings to establish legal parentage of the intended parents. 
Id. § 5-910(C)(2). 
 64. Id. § 5-911(A). A court has jurisdiction if an intended parent or a surrogate has been 
a resident of the state for at least 90 days, the resulting child is expected to be born in the 
state, or the embryo transfer is performed in the state. Id. § 5-911(B). The petition itself must 
include affidavits from the petitioner’s attorney, the reproductive endocrinologist, and the 
attorneys representing all parties to ensure compliance with the proposed legislation and a 
copy of the agreement. Id. § 5-911(C).  
 65. Id. § 5-911(D). 
 66. Id. § 5-911(F). 
 67. Id. § 5-911(G). 
 68. Status of all House Legislation Introduced 2013 Session, MD. LEGISLATURE (June 
12, 2013), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/Pubs-Current/Current-House-Status-Report.pdf. 
 69. H.B. 1218, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2011); H.B. 1255, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(S.D. 2012). 
 70. H.B. 1094, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2013). 
 71. House Bill 1218 Section 2(1) provides: 
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surrogate would be granted primary physical custody of the resulting child unless 
evidence showed she was unfit or would pose a serious risk to the child’s well-
being.73 Intended parents would presumptively be granted visitation or parenting 
time unless such arrangement would not be in the child’s best interests.74 
Regardless of custody or visitation, the intended parents would be responsible for 
supporting the child and for paying for both the surrogate’s medical expenses and 
the child’s medical expenses following birth.75 
The 2012 proposal was in some ways stricter and in some ways more lenient 
than the 2011 proposal. The 2012 proposal would only prohibit commercial 
surrogacy agreements, yet it also proclaimed “[n]o surrogacy agreement is 
enforceable.”76 While it increased the sanctions against physicians who helped 
execute surrogacy agreements,77 it decreased the punishments for other 
participants.78 Otherwise, its provisions were substantially similar to the 2011 
proposal.79 
The 2013 proposal sought to permit enforcement of gestational surrogacy 
contracts by mandating that children born to gestational carriers are the children “of 
the intended parents for all purposes and [are] not [children] of the gestational 
carrier” or her husband.80 However, enforcement would be limited to contracts 
meeting specified requirements.81 The proposal also had eligibility requirements for 
                                                                                                             
 [A]n arrangement, whether or not embodied in a contract, written or oral, 
entered into by two or more persons, including the mother, sometimes referred 
to as the ‘surrogate’ or ‘gestational carrier’ or ‘surrogate uterus’, [sic] and an 
intended rearing parent or parents, who agree, prior to insemination, or in the 
case of an implanted embryo, prior to embryo transfer or embryo implantation, 
to participate in the creation of a child, with the intention that the child will be 
reared as the child of one or more of the intended parents, other than the 
mother. 
 72. Id. §§ 3–6, 10 (subjecting participants to felonies, fines ranging from $30,000 to 
$80,000, and reports to the Board of Medical and Osteopathic Examiners). 
 73. Id. § 8. Even if the child is not presently in her possession, if the surrogate seeks 
custody, it will be granted to her after notifying the people in whose custody the child is. 
Concerns about the surrogate’s fitness cannot be raised until the child has been turned over 
to her. Id. Further, when the custody arrangement is being finalized, the presumption that the 
surrogate should maintain custody can only be overcome by proving, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that “the mother fails to meet minimal parenting standards necessary to 
satisfy the basic needs and welfare of the child.” Id. § 9. However, that determination cannot 
“be based on consideration of economic or social class.” Id. 
 74. Id. § 11. 
 75. Id. §§11, 12. 
 76. S.D. H.B. 1255 § 4. 
 77. House Bill 1255 would presume that any licensed professional who “induces, 
arranges, procures, or otherwise assists in the formation of a commercial surrogacy 
arrangement” and who either pays or is paid for such services committed an act of 
“unprofessional conduct.” Id. §§ 5, 6. 
 78. The proposal decreased the classifications for first– and second–time offenses for 
brokers and their staff from felonies to misdemeanors. S.D. H.B. 1255. Further, this proposal 
did not include punishments for intended parents or surrogates. 
 79. Cf. S.D. H.B. 1218, with S.D. H.B. 1255. 
 80. S.D. H.B. 1094 § 5. 
 81. The gestational carrier and the intended parents must be independently represented, 
id. § 9(3), the contract must be executed before the start of the IVF cycle, id. § 9(2), and the 
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surrogates82 and for intended parents.83 In case of breach, the courts would 
determine rights and obligations but could not order specific performance where it 
would impregnate the gestational carrier.84 Further, this proposal would not enforce 
traditional surrogacy arrangements.85 At the time of writing this Note, this proposal 




In 2013, Delaware passed the Gestational Carrier Agreement Act to enforce 
surrogacy contracts and to protect their parties’ interests.87 The legislation  
authorizes an agreement between a woman and another person, an 
unmarried couple, or a married couple in which the woman 
relinquishes all rights as a parent of a child conceived by means of 
assisted reproduction, and which provides that the person or married 
or unmarried couple become the parents of the child.88 
Further, the Act permits a judgment of parentage prior to birth by filing a 
petition that meets specified requirements.89 Delaware’s law mandates eligibility 
requirements for surrogates90 and intended parents.91 The contract must meet its 
                                                                                                             
contract must be written and signed before two witnesses, id. §§ 9(1), 9(6). Further, the 
contract must be accompanied by written acknowledgements from the intended parents and 
the gestational carrier that they received information about their rights and obligations under 
the contract. Id. § 9(4). If the gestational carrier is married, her husband must agree to the 
contract. Id. § 10(2). Notably, an agreement that includes provisions limiting the gestational 
carrier’s actions, requiring the gestational carrier undergo medical procedures, compensating 
the carrier, or offering to reimburse the carrier is still enforceable. Id. § 11. 
 82. The gestational carrier must be over twenty-one, id. § 7(1); have delivered a child 
previously, id. § 7(2); have undergone medical and psychological evaluations, id. § 7(3), (4); 
and possess health insurance until eight weeks postpartum, id. § 7(6). 
 83. The intended parents must complete a psychological evaluation, id. § 8(3); have a 
medical need for a gestational carrier, id. § 8(2); and at least one of the intended parents 
must be genetically related to the embryo, id. § 8(1). It appears that the statute’s wording 
only permits an individual to be an intended parent if there is a genetic relationship, which 
would not confer intended parent status to individuals who use donor gametes. 
 84. Id. §§ 15, 16. 
 85. “Any agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate and to relinquish 
that woman’s rights and duties as parent of a child conceived through assisted conception is 
unenforceable.” Id. § 3. “Surrogate” is defined as “an adult woman who enters into an 
agreement to bear a child conceived through assisted conception, using her own egg, for 
intended parents.” Id. § 1(4). 
 86. S.D. LEGISLATURE, H.B. 1094 BILL HISTORY, available at http://legis.sd.gov/ 
Legislative_Session/Bills/Bill.aspx?Bill=1094&Session=2013. 
 87. 79 Del. Laws 88 (2013). 
 88. Id. § 8-103(d). 
 89. The petition must clearly identify the parties and be accompanied by affidavits 
detailing that the pregnancy was achieved through ART, verifying the intended parents’ 
intent, verifying the surrogate and her spouse’s lack of parentage, and asserting that the 
agreement complied with the statute. Id. § 8-611(b). 
 90. A surrogate must be at least twenty-one, id. § 8-806(a)(1); have delivered at least 
one child, id. § 8-806(a)(2); have completed mental and medical evaluations, id. § 8-
806(a)(2)–(3); obtain health insurance for the duration of the pregnancy and eight weeks 
postpartum, id. § 8-806(a)(6); and be independently represented, id. § 8-806(a)(5). Her legal 
costs can be paid by the intended parents. Id. 
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own set of procedural requirements.92 Further, the contract must expressly detail 
the parties’ duties93 and that the surrogate selects her medical providers.94 Clauses 
restricting the surrogate’s activities, requiring medical procedures, and 
compensating her do not nullify the contract.95 All remedies at law or equity are 
available, but specific performance cannot be ordered to impregnate the 
surrogate.96 Intended parents must support the resulting child, even if they breach 
the contract.97 The governor signed this legislation on July 3, 2013. 
 
II. HISTORICAL NEW YORK REGULATION OF SURROGACY 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Matter of Baby M98 sparked a 
legislative maelstrom in New York regarding the legality and enforceability of 
commercial surrogacy agreements. This turbulence culminated in the passage of 
New York’s existing prohibitions. Nearly twenty years later, during the 2011–2012 
and 2013–2014 legislative sessions, New York had four legislative proposals to 
reform its surrogacy laws.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the American public’s ire was drawn by the 
infamous Baby M case,99 in which a traditional surrogate decided she did not want 
to give the resulting child to the intended parents.100 The ensuing legal battle 
captured the nation’s attention101—shaping the discussion of surrogacy and leading 
to public concern and resistance.102 This was clearly seen in New Jersey’s sister 
                                                                                                             
 91. An intended parent must be independently represented, id. § 8-806(b)(2), and have 
completed a mental health exam, id. § 8-806(b)(1). 
 92. The contract must be written and signed by the parties and their spouses, id. § 8-
807(b)(1)–(2); executed before transfer, id. § 8-807(b)(2); accompanied by written 
confirmations that the parties were informed, id. § 8-807(b)(4) (acknowledging they 
“received information about the legal, financial, and contractual rights, expectations, 
penalties, and obligations of the gestational carrier agreement.”); and be witnessed by two 
disinterested adults, id. § 8-807(b)(6). 
 93. Id. § 8-807(c)(1), (4). If the surrogate is married, her spouse must agree to the 
contract. Id. § 8-806(c)(2). 
 94. Id. § 8-807(c)(3). 
 95. Id. § 8-807(d). 
 96. Id. § 8-810. 
 97. Id. § 8-804(b). Interestingly, planning on a genetic link to the child is sufficient for a 
predetermination of parentage. For example, intended parents who plan to have a genetic 
link to the child but are foiled by a laboratory mix-up resulting in a non-genetic embryo 
being transferred are still the legal parents—unless a genetic parent sues within sixty days of 
the child’s birth. Id. § 8-804(c). 
 98. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 99. Scott, supra note 14, at 117–20; Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 100. Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1236. 
 101. See Lisa Belkin, Surrogate Law vs. Last Hope of the Childless, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 28, 
1992, at B1; Caster, supra note 5, at 497. 
 102. See Emily Gelmann, “I’m Just the Oven, It’s Totally Their Bun”: The Power and 
Necessity of the Federal Government to Regulate Commercial Gestational Surrogacy 
Arrangements and Protect the Legal Rights of Intended Parents, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
159, 163 (2011). Interestingly, some feminists and social conservatives found themselves in 
agreement on surrogacy. While some feminists saw surrogacy as an exercise of a woman’s 
right to contract, others saw it as an opportunity for the commodification of women. This 
latter group opposed surrogacy on that principle. Meanwhile, social conservatives opposed 
surrogacy because they feared it would lead to the breakdown of the traditional nuclear 
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state New York, whose attempts at surrogacy regulation were as chaotic and mixed 
as the nation’s views on surrogacy itself. 
Back then, the surrogacy market was booming in New York; estimates 
suggested forty percent of the 4000 surrogate births in the United States occurred 
there.103 The surrogacy market involved for-profit brokers who, for a fee of around 
$16,000, would match intended parents to willing surrogates.104 The typical 
contract would provide the surrogate with compensation between $10,000 and 
$20,000 for a live birth, plus out-of-pocket medical expenses.105 Some contracts 
required the surrogate to abort if the fetus was abnormal.106 Others detailed a 
prorated compensation schedule if the pregnancy did not result in a live birth.107 
After birth, the surrogate would relinquish the child to its biological father, whose 
wife would legally adopt the baby.108 Courts were willing to enforce these 
commercial surrogacy contracts into the mid-1980s.109 
Popular responses to surrogacy in general—and commercial surrogacy in 
particular—varied greatly. Some were supportive of the idea conceptually, but 
concerned about it in practice and especially wary of commercialization.110 For 
example, N.Y. State Senator John J. Marchi pronounced, “We find this an affront 
to human decency to continue the practice of commercial parenting.”111 Many 
viewed surrogacy as equivalent to prostitution.112 Others deemed commercial 
surrogacy a form of “baby selling” that “demeans and threatens women.”113  
Prior to this outpouring of rage, the New York State Legislature saw a flurry of 
legislative proposals regarding surrogacy. Between 1984 and 1992, twenty-one 
bills on the subject were introduced by ten legislators.114 A series of public hearings 
was conducted to solicit constituents’ opinions.115 The first hearing, cosponsored 
by the Assembly and Senate Judiciary Committees, was held in October 1986 to 
determine whether regulation was necessary.116 The Senate Judiciary Committee 
then recommended enforcement of surrogacy contracts as the best way to safeguard 
children’s interests and that regulation was the appropriate avenue.117 This 
grounded the most high-profile legislation of the period—a proposal in each 
                                                                                                             
family. See Scott, supra note 14, at 111–17. 
 103. Belkin, supra note 101, at B1, B3. 
 104. Id. at B3. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Of course, enforcement of such provisions would be questionable under Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (the right to privacy ensures a woman the right to terminate 
her pregnancy); accord BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 117. 
 107. Belkin, supra note 101, at B3. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Nassau Co. Sup. Ct. 1986). The 
surrogate agreed to be artificially inseminated with intended father’s sperm and to relinquish 
the resulting child for a fee. The court upheld the adoption of the child. Id. at 817–18. 
 110. Sack, supra note 23, at B5. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Van Niekerk & van Zyl, supra note 8, at 345. 
 113. See Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 22. 
 114. SUSAN MARKENS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 
39 (2007). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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legislative house to “regulate surrogate parenthood,”118 proposed by Senators 
Dunne and Goodhue.119 
The proposed legislation required parties be independently represented and 
undergo psychological counseling, mandated medical exams and health insurance 
for the biological father and surrogate,120 and required prior court approval of the 
surrogacy contract, including surrogate compensation.121 In April and May of 1987 
the N.Y. Senate Committee on Child Care held public hearings to discuss the 
bill,122 where a majority supported surrogacy.123 At the time of the first meeting, 
according to a public poll, sixty-nine percent of people believed surrogate parenting 
contracts should bind surrogates.124 
Despite this overwhelming support, “a coalition of religious groups, adoption 
and child-welfare advocates, and women’s groups” halted the legislators’ efforts,125 
and the legislation died in committee.126 In 1987, two bills were introduced to make 
all surrogacy contracts unenforceable or to ban commercial surrogacy; the 
following year, four additional bills were introduced.127 
At that point, Governor Mario Cuomo stepped into the developing quagmire and 
directed a task force to examine surrogacy and make legislative 
recommendations.128 The Task Force on Life and the Law recommended, in no 
uncertain terms, that all surrogacy be discouraged and that surrogacy contracts be 
unenforceable.129 The recommendation was to prohibit commercial surrogacy and 
its brokerage while discouraging noncommercial surrogacy.130 Governor Cuomo 
accepted the Task Force’s recommendations, with legislators in both houses 
proposing legislation to effectuate this recommendation in 1988.131 A fourth public 
hearing was held in December 1988,132 resulting in nearly forty people presenting a 
total of seven hours’ worth of testimony.133 But this legislative proposal, too, failed 
to survive the committee process.134 
The 1989–1990 legislative session showed surrogacy was still a hot issue;135 
five more proposals were introduced, all of which “declared surrogacy contracts 
                                                                                                             
 
 118. James Feron, Testimony is Given on Surrogate Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1987, at 
A39; MARKENS, supra note 114, at 40. 
 119. MARKENS, supra note 114, at 39. 
 120. Id. at 40. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 39. 
 123. Id. at 40; Feron, supra note 118. 
 124. See Feron, supra note 118.  
 125. Scott, supra note 14, at 118. 
 126. MARKENS, supra note 114, at 40.  
 127. Id. 
 128. McMahon, supra note 15, at 365. 
 129. See id. 
 130. MARKENS, supra note 114, at 40.  
 131. Id.at 40–41. 
 132. Id. at 41. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. Of the nine proposals in 1987–1988, a grand total of none survived the 
legislative process; none escaped committee. Id.  
 135. The continuing legislative fascination can partially be attributed to the fact that two 
of the nation’s twenty-nine “surrogate parenting centers” were located in New York, 
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void and unenforceable.”136 Included in these proposals was a reiteration of 
Cuomo’s legislation that included criminal penalties for surrogate contract 
brokerage.137 Again, none became law.  
The 1991–1992 session saw five surrogacy-related bills, four in opposition to 
surrogacy contracts.138 The odd-bill-out was introduced at the end of the legislative 
session by two fervent surrogacy proponents, Assemblymen Koppell and 
Balboni.139 
In 1992, the legislature enacted a bill declaring surrogacy contracts “contrary to 
the public policy of [New York],” as well as “void and unenforceable.”140 The 
legislature created civil penalties for those who “knowingly request, accept, 
receive, pay or give any fee, compensation or other remuneration, directly or 
indirectly, in connection with any surrogate parenting contract, or induce, arrange 
or otherwise assist in arranging a surrogate parenting contract for a fee, 
compensation or other remuneration.”141 The surrogate, her husband, and the 
intended parents could receive monetary penalties of up to $500.142 For brokers, the 
monetary penalty is up to $10,000 plus the fee charged for arranging the 
contract.143 These penalties do not apply when payments result from an otherwise-
approved adoption or from medical costs of a mother, which are “incurred in 
connection with the birth of the child.”144 Ultimately, the bill was approved 59–0 in 
the Senate and 104–39 in the Assembly.145 This made New York the eighteenth 
state to limit surrogacy.146  
Thus, as it stands, New York does not penalize the formation of noncommercial 
surrogacy contracts but will not enforce any surrogacy contracts. These contracts 
can be for either traditional or gestational surrogacy.147 The law does not provide a 
way to resolve disputes between a genetic mother and a surrogate.148 Thus, a 
gestational surrogate can be given parental rights to a nongenetic child, who would 
not exist but for the surrogacy agreement.149 However, trial courts can determine 
maternity and paternity without adoption proceedings.150  
                                                                                                             
including the one that arranged the contract resulting in Baby M. Sack, supra note 23, at B5. 
 136. MARKENS, supra note 117, at 43. 
 137. Id. at 43–44.  
 138. Id. at 44. Interestingly, one of these antisurrogacy bills went much further, stating 
that “all in vitro pregnancies” were contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable. 
CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 229–30. 
 139. MARKENS, supra note 114, at 44. 
 140. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2013). By definition, all surrogacy 
contracts, meaning both commercial and noncommercial, are unenforceable under § 122; 
however, § 123 actually penalizes only parties to commercial surrogacy agreements.  
 141. Id. § 123-1. 
 142. Id. § 123-2(a). 
 143. Id. § 123-2(b). Anyone caught coordinating a surrogacy contract a subsequent time 
is “guilty of a felony.” Id. 
 144. See id. (exempting altruistic surrogacy from the enumerated penalties).  
 145. MARKENS, supra note 114, at 45. 
 146. Belkin, supra note 101, at B1. At the time, New York joined Washington, Virginia, 
Utah, Oregon, Oklahoma, North Dakota, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Nevada, Nebraska, 
Michigan, Louisiana, Kentucky, Indiana, Florida, Arizona, and Arkansas. Id. 
 147. TASK FORCE, supra note 15. 
 148. Id.  
 149. See id. New York has determined, as a matter of law, that the biological mother of a 
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III. PRESENT PROPOSALS TO REFORM NEW YORK SURROGACY LAW 
 
In the over twenty years since the enactment of the surrogacy prohibitions, four 
bills have been introduced to the New York State Legislature to lift the ban on 
commercial surrogacy contracts.  
New York Senate Bill No. 2547 (“S.B. 2547”), initially introduced on January 
18, 2013 by Senator Hoylman, would allow “loving and committed couples [to] 
have every opportunity to raise and nurture their own genetically linked children—
including the utilization of . . . gestational surrogate parenting contracts.”151 The 
legislation, however, would simply repeal Article Eight of the Domestic Relations 
Law,152 and does not provide any regulatory language for commercial surrogacy 
contracts,153 and would thus permit contracts in any form.154 In April 2013, Senator 
Hoylman also introduced the far more specific New York Senate Bill No. 4617 
(“S.B. 4617”), twin to New York Assembly Bill 6701 (“Assem. B. 6701.”).155 
Assem. B. 6701, introduced in April 2013 by nineteen assembly members, 
would improve couples’ access to surrogacy by allowing the creation of 
enforceable commercial surrogacy agreements,156 permitting preemptive judgment 
of parentage,157 and creating guidelines for the termination of surrogacy 
contracts.158 When intended parents pay their surrogates consideration beyond 
reasonable expenses, Assem. B. 6701 requires them to escrow the funds before the 
start of the cycle.159 This compensation must be “reasonable,” established through 
good-faith negotiation, and based on the service provided, expenses incurred, time 
used, and inconvenience encountered.160 It cannot be used to “purchase gametes or 
embryos” nor “for the relinquishment of a parental interest in a child.”161  
The legislation also specifies who may enter into a surrogacy agreement.162 A 
surrogate must be at least twenty-one years old,163 have had a medical evaluation 
                                                                                                             
child conceived through use of a donor egg is the birth mother. Id. 
 150. T.V. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 929 N.Y.S.2d 139, 144 (2011); see Doe v. N.Y. 
City Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d 180, 184 (Sup. Ct. 2004). Contra Feigenbaum v. N.Y. 
State Dept. of Health, No. 2009-019430 slip op at 4 (Suffolk Co. Sup. Ct. Oct. 22, 2010). 
 151. BRAD HOYLMAN, SPONSOR MEMORANDUM 2013 NY S.B. 2547, at 1 (Jan. 23, 2013) 
[hereinafter SPONSOR MEMO]. 
 152. S.B. 2547, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013). 
 153. See id. 
 154. See infra Part IV for recommended changes to the proposals. Similarly, the Sponsor 
Memo refers to its legislation as “the first step” towards allowing intended parents to pursue 
genetically related children through medical technology and protecting their rights upon 
entering valid commercial surrogacy contracts. SPONSOR MEMO, supra note 151, at 2. 
 155. S.B. 4617, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013). Because of the substantive 
similarities, the two proposals will be discussed in tandem. The afore-referenced 2012 
proposal was this legislation’s predecessor, however it was significantly altered prior to 
reintroduction in 2013. As such, it will not be separately addressed. 
 156. Assem. B. 6701, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 581-401 (N.Y. 2013). 
 157. Id. § 581-203. 
 158. Id. § 581-406. 
 159. Id. § 581-405(a)(6). The payments must conclude within eight weeks of the end of 
pregnancy. Id. § 581-502(b). 
 160. Id. § 581-502(a)–(b). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. § 581-404. 
 163. Id. § 581-404(a)(1). 
2014] LEGISLATING LABORS OF LOVE 15 
 
“relating to the anticipated pregnancy,”164 consult with independent legal counsel 
about the contract’s expectations and obligations,165 and either have or obtain 
health insurance before the cycle that will cover “major medical treatments and 
hospitalizations” throughout the pregnancy and for eight weeks postpartum.166 The 
intended parents167 must have consulted with independent legal counsel about the 
expectations and obligations of the surrogacy contract.168 An intended married 
parent must be not be legally separated from his or her spouse.169 
In order for a surrogacy agreement to be enforceable, it must be in writing and 
signed by the intended parent and the surrogate170 prior to the start of the cycle.171 
The surrogate retains the right to choose her medical providers throughout the 
pregnancy.172 By signing, the surrogate agrees “to undergo embryo transfer and 
attempt to carry and give birth to the child” and to give the child’s custody to the 
intended parents at birth.173 The intended parents must agree to “accept custody of 
all resulting children immediately upon birth regardless of number, gender, or 
mental or physical condition” and to be solely responsible for their upkeep, care, 
and maintenance.174  
The legislation would allow a “judgment of parentage” prior to the birth of a 
child resulting from a surrogacy contract.175 The petition may be filed any time 
after the contract’s execution.176 It must meet procedural requirements.177 The court 
                                                                                                             
 
 164. Id. § 581-404(a)(2). 
 165. Id. § 581-404(a)(3). 
 166. Id. § 581-404(a)(4). The intended parents could provide insurance as part of the 
surrogacy contract. Id.  
 167. New York would permit individuals and unmarried couples to enter into surrogacy 
agreements as intended parents. Id. § 581-404(b)(1), (2). For the ease of communication, 
throughout the remainder of the Note, “intended parents” generally refers to single and 
coupled intended parents. 
 168. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-404(b)(1) (N.Y. 2013). 
 169. Id. § 581-404(b)(2). However, if the intended parent has been separated from his or 
her spouse for over three years before the formation of the agreement, then the spouse does 
not have to be involved in the contract and is unable to receive parental rights through the 
surrogacy contract. Id. § 581-404(b)(2)(ii). 
 170. Id. § 581-405(a)(1). If the surrogate is married prior to execution of the contract, her 
spouse must be a party to the contract, id., and the parties must meet the eligibility 
requirements discussed above. Id. §§ 581-404, 405(a)(3), 405(a)(4). If the surrogate gets 
married between contract’s execution and its completion, the new spouse does not have to 
sign the contract and is not presumed to be a parent of the child. Id. § 581-407. 
 171. Id. § 581-405(a)(2). This does not include the required medical examination. 
 172. Id. § 581-405(a)(7)(i)(C). She is to consult with the intended parents, but they 
otherwise have no say in which the surrogate chooses. Id. 
 173. Id. §§ 581-405(a)(7)(i)(A)–(B). 
 174. Id. §§ 581-405(a)(7)(ii)(A)–(B). The statute also requires the intended parents 
acknowledge that these rights and responsibilities “are not assignable.” Id. § 581-
405(a)(7)(ii)(C).  
 175. Id. § 581-201(c)(ii), 203. 
 176. Id. § 581-203(a). 
 177. The petition must include a statement that the intended parents or the surrogate had 
resided in N.Y. for over 90 days, id. § 581-203(b)(1); an attorney certification that the 
parties are eligible and that the contract meets the statutory requirements, id. § 581-
203(b)(2); and a statement that the parties entered the agreement “knowingly and 
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then predetermines parentage, awarding legal parenthood to the intended parents at 
birth178 and records the decision.179 The “proceedings, records, and identities” of 
the parties are sealed unless the parties petition.180 The intended parents’ 
willingness to pay the surrogate “reasonable compensation” more than “reasonable 
medical and ancillary costs” of pregnancy will not bar parentage judgments.181 If 
intended parents do not pursue and obtain a judgment of parentage, legal parentage 
is assigned based on “the best interests of the child.”182 The original court with 
jurisdiction over the matter maintains exclusive jurisdiction until the child is 180 
days old.183 
Finally, Assem. B. 6701 provides for mechanisms to terminate an executed 
surrogacy agreement.184 The intended parents can terminate the contract after 
judgment of parentage, but before the surrogate is pregnant, simply by providing 
written notice to the other parties and filing with the court to vacate the judgment 
of parentage.185 Unless otherwise detailed in the contract, “all remedies available at 
law or equity” can be sought and granted except for specific performance to 
impregnate the surrogate.186 The trial court is responsible for resolving disputes 
arising from the contract and determining “the respective rights and obligations of 
the parties.”187 
 
IV. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSALS 
 
The present prohibitory surrogacy regime in New York has failed to keep up 
with developments in ART. This is unsurprising considering the legislature 
approved the statute in 1993—a mere seven years after the first baby from a 
gestational surrogacy arrangement in the United States was born.188 Gestational 
surrogacy was developed after traditional surrogacy because gestational surrogacy 
requires more advanced technology than artificial insemination.189 At the time of 
passage, traditional surrogacy was the norm;190 however, gestational surrogacy is 
now far more common.191 Notably, the current legislation draws no distinction 
between the two. 
                                                                                                             
voluntarily,” id. § 581-203(b)(3). 
 178. Id. § 581-203(c). 
 179. Id. § 581-203(c)(5). 
 180. Id. § 581-410. 
 181. Id. § 581-203(d). 
 182. Id. § 581-408. When the court is making this determination, the statute specifically 
provides it should consider “genetics and the intent of the parties.” Id. 
 183. Id. § 581-411. 
 184. Id. § 581-406. 
 185. Id. § 581-406(a)–(b). 
 186. Id. § 581-409(b)–(c). 
 187. Id. § 581-409(a). 
 188. Denise E. Lascarides, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy 
Contracts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1221, 1226 (1997). 
 189. LYNDA BECK FENWICK, PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW ETHICS OF CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND FAMILY 215 (1998).  
 190. Id. 
 191. See Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 
Consideration of the Gestational Carrier: A Committee Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
1838, 1838 (June 2013) [hereinafter ASRM Opinion] (clinics reluctant to perform traditional 
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The interests of all potential parties to surrogacy contracts should be considered 
when drafting laws to govern surrogacy. New York’s law fails to keep up with the 
desires of intended parents. Many couples discover they are infertile when they try 
to start families in their thirties.192 They often find that adoption is not a viable 
option, as there are fewer children than intended parents on the adoption market, 
and the parents may be deemed too old by adoption agencies.193 Also, adoption 
does not provide a genetic link between child and parents. Surrogacy solves both 
issues by providing the possibility of a genetic link between parent and child and 
by facilitating the creation and placement of children. Further, unlike other aspects 
of ART, which are covered by medical insurance in a few states,194 surrogacy is 
paid almost entirely out-of-pocket. Despite the statutory prohibitions, over five 
percent of gestational surrogacy contracts are executed in New York.195  
New York’s restrictiveness on surrogacy is surprising considering its typical 
role as a trailblazer on social issues.196 Liberalizing laws on surrogacy is the right 
decision. While S.B. 2547 would accomplish this by simply removing the statutory 
prohibition, the proposal is inadequate as it does not provide any regulatory support 
or guidance.197 S.B. 4617 and Assem. B. 6701 are drastic improvements on the 
status quo, but they are imperfect. This Part evaluates the proposals in context of 




Mandating the enforceability of surrogacy arrangements is the right legislative 
decision. 
The Constitution provides support for enforcing surrogate parenting contracts—
whether commercial or altruistic.198 These supports include the right to privacy, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.199 The Due 
Process Clause supports freedom of contract, with prohibitions on unconscionable 
                                                                                                             
surrogacy arrangements); Erin Y. Hisano, Gestational Surrogacy Maternity Disputes: 
Refocusing on the Child, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 517, 524 (2011) (gestational surrogacy 
increased from less than five percent to over fifty percent of surrogacy arrangements 
between 1988 and 1994); supra note 22 and accompanying text; Scott, supra note 14, at 122. 
 192. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 111. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Texas all require 
insurance companies cover the costs of IVF. Jennifer Gunning, Regulating ART in the USA: 
A Mixed Approach, in THE REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, 55, 61 
(Jennifer Gunning & Helen Szoke eds., 2003). 
 195. GUGUCHEVA, supra note 23, at 15. 
 196. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex 
Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 25, 2011, at A1; Thomas 
Kaplan, Sweeping Limits on Guns Become Law in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2013, at 
A15. 
 197. Regulation is necessary to prevent peculiar arrangements, such as a surrogate 
carrying two embryos for two different sets of intended parents. CROCKIN & JONES, supra 
note 1, at 247.  
 198. “Constitutional challenges to statutes prohibiting surrogacy have also been brought 
and won (in both Arizona and Utah) by couples and gestational carriers arguing that the 
statutes violated their constitutional rights.” Id. at 214.  
 199. Caster, supra note 5, at 502. 
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contracts, or those that subjugate others.200 Freely-entered surrogacy contracts 
should be treated as other valid contracts—enforceable with the parties’ intent 
controlling.201 Arguably, there is a constitutional right to procreate,202 which should 
extend from natural to assisted reproduction, as both means seek the same end.203 
Additionally, the ability to enter contracts, including surrogacy agreements, is 
included in the meaning of personal autonomy; to prohibit such action would 
“violate women’s right to self-determination and reinforce the negative stereotype 
of women as incapable of full rational agency.”204 Enforcing surrogacy agreements 
strengthens self-determination and personal autonomy, as enforcement 
“presupposes that the woman’s body is hers and hers alone unless she consents to 
some particular use of it.”205 “The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and 
intelligently agree to gestate and deliver a baby for intending parents carries 
overtones of the reasoning that for centuries prevented women from attaining equal 
economic rights and professional status under the law.”206 Women who undertake 
to be surrogates are generally “quite satisfied” with their decision.207 Many 
                                                                                                             
 
 200. Id. at 507. 
 201. Id. at 508. 
 202. D.M.T. v. T.M.H., No. SC12-261, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 2422, at *24 (Fla. Nov. 7, 
2013) (“It is a basic tenant of our society and our law that individuals have the fundamental 
constitutionally protected rights to procreate and to be a parent to their children. These 
constitutional rights are recognized by . . . the United States Constitution.”); Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”); TASK FORCE, supra note 26. This 
right has been conceptualized as both a positive and a negative right. ART creates “a claim 
on society to guarantee, through whatever means possible, the capacity to reproduce.” 
BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 99. However, this could lead to constitutional claims 
for access to services and financial assistance. More likely, the right will be conceptualized 
as a negative right: the state does not need to provide affirmative support; it just needs to 
permit legal access. ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 225 (“Procreative rights are negative in 
protecting against private or state interference, but they give no positive assistance to 
someone who lacks the resources essential to exercise the right.”). Contra Ann MacLean 
Massie, Symposium on John A. Robertson’s Children of Choice: Regulating Choice: A 
Constitutional Law Response to Professor John A. Robertson’s Children of Choice, 52 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 135, 162 (1995) (“[T]he cases suggest that the state may 
constitutionally regulate reproductive behavior outside the particular context of marital 
intimacy.”); see also Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473, 
1484–87 (1995) (reviewing JOHN A ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE 
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994)) (“If government need not supply the financial 
resources necessary to exercise the right to procreate, it is not clear why government must 
supply the judicial resources necessary to exercise the right either.”). 
 203. See TASK FORCE, supra note 26. 
 204. Liezl van Zyl & Anton van Niekerk, Interpretations, Perspectives and Intentions in 
Surrogate Motherhood, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 404, 404 (2000). 
 205. Arneson, supra note 7, at 162. 
 206. Caster, supra note 5, at 512. 
 207. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 31. There is little evidence showing women 
are exploited by surrogacy contracts. Jennifer L. Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or 
Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surrogates Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6 
WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 529, 545 (2007). 
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surrogates receive an increase in “self-worth” from the experience.208 Prohibitions 
on surrogacy are reminiscent of outdated patriarchal doctrines, like coverture. 
Legalizing commercial surrogacy contracts furthers women’s independent rights to 
make decisions and to contract.209 As in other fields, the right to contract can be 
governed by regulations addressing legitimate public policy concerns while still 
safeguarding personal autonomy.  
Further, enforcing surrogacy contracts would provide social and economic 
benefits to the parties involved. Economically, parties would not contract if they 
were not to receive a benefit outweighing their investment.210 Without the 
agreement being enforceable at the outset, neither intended parents nor surrogates 
have a guaranteed incentive, and thus they will be less willing to engage.211 
Further, by permitting the enforcement of such contracts, society benefits through 




The New York proposals generally strike an appropriate balance between 
preventing exploitive arrangements and safeguarding personal autonomy, however 
three additional requirements would further these goals: require the surrogate and 
her spouse to undergo psychological and medical exams, require a surrogate to 
have previously given birth, and require physical and psychological exams for the 
intended parents with the results provided to the surrogate so she can make an 




The proposed requirements mandating that the surrogate be at least twenty-one 
years old,213 have consulted with independent legal counsel214 and possess health 
                                                                                                             
 
 208. Vasanti Jadva, Clare Murray, Emma Lycett, Fiona MacCallum & Susan Golombok, 
Surrogacy: The Experiences of Surrogate Mothers, 18 HUM. REPROD. 2196, 2204 (2003). 
 209. Caster, supra note 5, at 512; Watson, supra note 207, at 545–46. 
 210. Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate 
Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 21, 22–23 (1989). 
 211. Id. at 23 (lacking assurances that the contract will be enforced, intended parents will 
not be willing to invest as much money into the agreement, so surrogates are deprived the 
ability to set fees according to their needs). 
 212. There is no adverse effect on the family relationship or the parent-child bond when 
children lack a genetic or gestational bond with their parents at age three. See Susan 
Golombok, C. Murray, V. Jadva, E. Lycett, F. MacCallum & J. Rust, Non-Genetic and Non-
Gestational Parenthood: Consequences for Parent-Child Relationships and the 
Psychological Well-Being of Mothers, Fathers and Children at Age 3, 21 HUM. REPROD. 
1918, 1919 (2006). 
 213. Mandating surrogates be over twenty-one is a valid restraint that presumably is 
intended to protect younger women who may not be able to fully understand the seriousness 
of a surrogacy agreement. Other states have similar requirements. See, e.g., 79 Del. Laws 88 
(2013) (surrogate must be at least twenty-one.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2013) (surrogate 
must be at least eighteen.). See also ASRM Opinion, supra note 191, at 1840 (“Given the 
very complex emotional tasks of the pregnancy and postpartum, as well as the demands of 
negotiating a relationship with intended parents, it is reasonable to adopt a conservative 
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insurance lasting eight weeks postpartum215 are straightforward and justified 
requirements that do not warrant further discussion. 
Requiring potential surrogates to have a medical “evaluation and consultation 
with a health care provider regarding the anticipated pregnancy”216 is a good start, 
but inadequate because it does not require a psychological evaluation.217 The 
required consultation protects the physical health of potential surrogates;218 
however it does not assess nor protect psychological or emotional wellbeing. 
Psychological screening could prevent women prone to surrogacy-induced distress 
from participating by identifying those with unstable personalities.219 Additionally, 
a mandatory psychological exam, with or without mandatory counseling,220 would 
help assuage concerns about coercion, lack of informed consent, and undue 
influence.221 Further, ensuring psychological stability would ensure surrogates are 
able to “view the child they are carrying as not theirs” and are comfortable 
relinquishing the child to the intended parents.222 Intended parents would also be 
more comfortable with a surrogate who has a clean bill of mental health, as mental 
state can impact pregnancy outcomes.223 Making these steps routine in surrogacy 
                                                                                                             
position about age and surrogacy by setting the minimum age at 21.”). 
 214. Mandating that the parties be independently represented is common. See, e.g., CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 796279 (2013); Del. Laws 88 (2013); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2006). 
 215. Such a requirement is logical as recovery from labor and delivery usually takes 
around eight weeks. Patient Education Post-Partum, PHYSICIANS FOR WOMEN (2004), 
http://www.physicians-for-women.com/patients/postpartum.asp. Insurance can be procured 
by the surrogate or intended parents. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-404(a)(4) (N.Y. 2013). 
 216. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-103(s) (N.Y. 2013). 
 217. Some states already require a psychological evaluation. See, e.g., 79 Del. Laws 88 
(2013) § 8-806(a)(2)–(3); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(d) (2013). The 2012 proposal 
required the surrogate pass a mental health evaluation. Assem. B. 10499, 235th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. § 581-402(A) (N.Y. 2012).  
 218. Cf. Belkin, supra note 101, at B3. It is logical to require medical examinations to 
ensure the surrogate does not communicate a disease to the fetus. CROCKIN & JONES, supra 
note 1, at 190. It would also be valuable to require the surrogate’s medical records be 
provided to intended parents. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 117 (describing case 
where surrogate transferred a potentially lethal strep infection to the fetus she was carrying). 
Providing the surrogate’s medical records could alert intended parents to surrogate behavior 
that could make her a suboptimal carrier for their fetus. Id.  
 219. See, e.g., Arneson, supra note 7, at 160. Surrogacy does not lead to psychological 
trauma or negative outcomes for willing participants. Jadva, Murray, Lycett, MacCallum & 
Golombok, supra note 208, at 2203. Any psychological unease is short-lived and transient in 
nature. Id.  
 220. Providing therapy and other support to surrogates may improve their satisfaction 
with the surrogacy process. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 34. The 2012 version 
required the mental health professional to offer counseling to all participants in the 
surrogacy arrangement. Assem. B. 10499 § 581-402(B) (N.Y. 2013). If the evaluation was 
unfavorable, further counseling could be used in order to pass the mental evaluation. Id. § 
581-402(C).  
 221. Caster, supra note 5, at 509.  
 222. Jadva, Murray, Lycett, MacCallum & Golombok, supra note 208, at 2203. 
 223. See, e.g., Ctr. for Neuroscience in Women’s Health, Pregnancy and Mental Health, 
STANFORD SCH. OF MED., http://womensneuroscience.stanford.edu/wellness_clinic/ 
Pregnancy.html. For example, untreated depression can lead to low birth weight for the 
infant and premature or prolonged labor for the surrogate. Id. In cases where mental health 
issues are treated, the fetus can be exposed to the medication through the placenta. Id. New 
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contract formation would protect all parties by promoting voluntary compliance 
and decreasing litigation.224 
The surrogate’s partner should also be subject to both a medical and a 
psychological exam. The medical evaluation would protect a fetus from 
communicable disease225 and provide more information to the intended parents, 
allowing them to make informed decisions about the risks to which they are willing 
to expose their intended child. Similarly, the psychological exam would provide a 
window into the surrogate’s support structure and ensure that her partner 
acknowledges and approves of her undertaking.226  
Legislation should require surrogates to have already given birth.227 While a 
competent woman is the best judge of what she can and cannot handle and whether 
to undertake a particular risk, especially when dealing with her own body,228 she 
can only do so effectively when able to make an informed decision. Women who 
have already had children are better informed as to the nature of pregnancy and can 
more easily gauge the likelihood that they will be distressed by the fact that the 






                                                                                                             
Hampshire already requires the intended parents receive a copy of a nonmedical evaluation 
by a psychologist, psychiatrist, or the equivalent prior to contract formation. N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 168-B:18 (2013). Virginia already requires medical and psychological reports 
be accessible for all parties. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(7) (2010). Utah requires 
certification that all parties have participated in counseling and have discussed options and 
consequences of the contract. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(d) (West 2008). Required 
sharing of medical and psychological information, even when the surrogate is known to the 
intended parents, promotes informed decisionmaking.  
 224. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 34. Further, if the women who are 
considering entering into surrogacy contracts are aware that contracts are presumptively 
enforceable, they will know their decision is likely irrevocable. This encourages self-
selection of surrogates who are comfortable with this outcome. Richard A. Epstein, 
Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L.R. 2305, 2339 (1995). 
 225. Cf. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 190. Other states already require this. See, 
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(7) (2010). Requiring these evaluations from other 
members of the surrogate’s household would be requiring too much. 
 226. The 2012 version would have required the surrogate’s spouse pass a mental 
evaluation as well. Assem. B. 10499 § 581-402(A) (N.Y. 2012). Generally, even where 
members of the surrogate’s support network were initially concerned or opposed to the 
surrogacy arrangement, by the contract’s conclusion they were often supportive. Jadva, 
Murray, Lycett, MacCallum & Golombok, supra note 208, at 2203. 
 227. Such a requirement can be found in other states’ statutes. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-160. It was also found in the 2012 version of the proposal. Assem. B. 10499 § 581-
404(A)(2) (N.Y. 2012). See also ASRM Opinion, supra note 191, at 1840 (“To give true 
informed consent without the experience of a pregnancy and a delivery is problematic 
because of the prolonged, intense, and unique nature of the experience.”). 
 228. See Kristen Walker, Should There Be Limits on Who May Access Assisted 
Reproductive Services? A Legal Perspective, in THE REGULATION OF ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, 123, 125 (Jennifer Gunning & Helen Szoke eds., 2003). 
 229. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 34; see Jadva, Murray, Lycett, MacCallum 
& Golombok, supra note 208, at 2203–04. 
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2. Intended Parents 
 
The proposals should maintain their liberal eligibility requirements for intended 
parents, but they should have to undergo physical and emotional evaluation.230 
Intended parents can be married, coupled, or single.231 The proposals maximize 
access to parenthood by not placing arbitrary requirements on intended parents, 
such as requiring a biological link between an intended parent and the resulting 
child,232 or that a medical condition prevent the intended mother from safely 
carrying a pregnancy to term.233 Limiting surrogacy contracts to genetically linked 
intended parents would unfairly restrict access.234 Similarly, commercial surrogacy 
should not be limited to those who physically cannot gestate a pregnancy; it should 
be available to women who want to have genetic children but do not want to be 
pregnant.235 Society does not require one be physically unable to care for her 
parents to hire a nurse, nor that someone be physically unable to stay home and 
take care of her children to hire a nanny; anyone can hire other caretakers. This 
principle should apply to surrogates. Similarly, surrogacy should be available to 
women who do not want to be mommy tracked, thus allowing reproduction to no 
longer be a hindrance to women’s careers, possibly allowing more women the 
opportunity to enter the upper echelons of government and business by making 
their parenting role analogous to a father’s.236  
Yet, New York should require physical and psychological examinations for 
intended parents, with the results accessible to potential surrogates to provide them 
more information to make an informed decision about whether they want to work 
                                                                                                             
 
 230. The 2012 proposal would have required intended parents pass a mental health 
evaluation. Assem. B. 10499 §§ 581-402(A), 581-404(B)(1) (N.Y. 2012).  
 231. Compare Assem. B. 6701 § 581-404(b)(1), (2) (N.Y. 2013) with FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 742.15 (2013), and NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045(2) (2013). The only restriction is that 
a married intended parent cannot be separated from his or her spouse. Assem. B. 6701 § 
581-404(b)(2) (N.Y. 2013). However, if the intended parent has been separated for over 
three years before the formation of the agreement, then the spouse does not have to be 
involved in the contract and is unable to receive parental rights through the surrogacy 
contract. Id. § 581-404(b)(2)(ii). 
 232. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. 742.15(3)(e); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(9).  
 233. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-160(B)(8).  
 234. The use of donated genetic material for procreation has become a mainstay in ART. 
CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 190. Donor gametes can be used to create an embryo for 
use in a gestational surrogacy contract. See SPONSOR MEMO, supra note 151, at 1. 
235 In fact, there has been an increase in the use of surrogacy by women who want to have 
children but do not want to be pregnant. ‘Social Surrogacy’ an Option for Moms-to-Be Who 
Shun Pregnancy, ABC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2014), http://gma.yahoo.com/blogs/abc-blogs/social-
surrogacy-option-moms-shun-pregnancy-160413402--abc-news-parenting.html.  
 236. This would, on a micro level, allow women to have it all—a family and a career—
without having to sacrifice one for the other. Eduardo Porter, Motherhood Still a Cause of 
Pay Inequality, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, at B1 (much of the pay gap between men and 
women is caused by motherhood and the constraints it places on their careers), and, on the 
macro level, allow society to reap the benefits of female leadership. See, e.g., Sam Bennett, 
Who Needs More Women in Government? Everyone., http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-
bennett/who-needs-more-women-in-g_b_485685.html (women work collaboratively for 
“win-win outcomes,” increasing net benefits to all). 
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with these specific people.237 Such examination of the intended parents would help 
fulfill the duty of care owed to surrogates and the resulting children by the 
surrogacy agency.238 Additionally, the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine (ASRM) strongly recommends psychological evaluations for all gamete 
donors and recipients,239 there is no reason this should not extend to intended 
parents, as ASRM’s guidelines mandate that “psychological consultation should be 
required in individuals in whom there appear to be factors that warrant further 
evaluation.”240 However, these evaluations should not be used as an automatic bar 
on intended parents’ entering surrogacy contracts; an automatic bar would lead to 
discrimination and impermissible denials of access.241 Even if the intended parents 
would be able to procreate naturally, their ability to do so through surrogacy is not 
a given.242 The key to a surrogacy agreement is the surrogate, who should be able 




The proposals would permit intended parents to compensate surrogates above 
and beyond costs associated with pregnancy, as long as compensation is reasonable 
and negotiated in good-faith,243 and however the promised payment should be 
guaranteed. 
                                                                                                             
 
 237. A similar requirement is already in place in New Hampshire. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 168-B:18 (2013). Virginia requires medical and psychological reports be accessible to all 
parties. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(7) (2013). For example, a surrogate may be interested 
in knowing the environment in which the child she would carry will be raised. Cf. 
Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., 700 A.2d 453, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that 
a prima facie case of negligence existed against surrogacy clinic that failed to evaluate 
intended father’s psychological state and the child was murdered by the intended father). 
Screening intended parents could identify potential dangers and prevent tragedies by 
permitting informed surrogates to decide against providing services to questionable intended 
parents. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 239. Further, testing could reduce the number of 
surrogates that seek custody of children they carried. See Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, 
with Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009, at A1.  
 238. See Huddleston, 700 A.2d at 460 (“[A] business operating for the sole purpose of 
organizing and supervising the very delicate process of creating a child, which reaps 
handsome profits from such endeavor, must be held accountable for the foreseeable risks of 
the surrogacy undertaking because a ‘special relationship’ exists between the surrogacy 
business, its client-participants, and, most especially, the child which the surrogacy 
undertaking creates.”). 
 239. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 132. 
 240. Id. at 133. Couples who learn that they need to use the contribution of others to 
achieve pregnancy often become quite upset, including experiencing “a major crisis,” 
depression, “a blow to their self-esteem,” or guilt. Cf. MACHELLE M. SEIBEL & SUSAN 
CROCKIN, FAMILY BUILDING THROUGH EGG AND SPERM DONATION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND 
ETHICAL ISSUES 35 (1996). 
 241. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 362. 
 242. Without the voluntary acquiescence of a surrogate, the intended parents are unable 
to pursue a child through surrogacy.  
 243. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-502(b) (N.Y. 2013). Notably, the Center for Surrogate 
Parenting pays its surrogates between $20,000 and $30,000 per pregnancy, with experienced 
surrogates receiving higher fees. Steiner, supra note 12. 
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Society allows people to purchase services every day; surrogacy is another 
service to be purchased.244 We already use skilled or manual labor as means to an 
end in various aspects of our lives, often with no objection.245 It is acceptable to 
hire a nurse for the sick, an aide for the infirm, and a sitter for children. A surrogate 
should be treated equivalently to a paid caretaker.246 Morally, there is no difference 
between paying a nanny to care for a toddler for a year and paying a woman to 
gestate a fetus for nine months. In both cases, a parent is paying someone to 
provide care, including feeding and protecting the child; in both cases it is possible 
for the caretaker to emotionally invest in and develop an attachment to the charge. 
We even permit men to sell sperm and women to sell eggs. We do not require these 
individuals provide these materials from the goodness of their hearts; we allow 
compensation above and beyond the costs for retrieval. It logically follows that we 
should permit women to use their biological capability to help others procreate 
while increasing their own welfare.247 
Though surrogates may undertake the process and associated risks for altruistic 
or personal reasons,248 they deserve compensation above and beyond reasonable 
costs because they are performing a unique service.249 The surrogacy process is not 
speedy. Women that undertake this labor of love deserve to have their time and 
effort compensated.250 Further, they should be compensated for the risks they 
undertake.251 The proposals explicitly permit surrogates’ compensation based on 
                                                                                                             
 
 244. See van Niekerk & van Zyl, supra note 8, at 346. 
 245. See id. For example, the relationship between a surrogate and the intended parents is 
comparable to other contractually held jobs: a police officer and the village government; or a 
professional athlete and the team for which he plays. In all cases, the employee contracts 
away some control over his or her body for the benefit of others to achieve the goals agreed 
to at the contract’s signing. See Arneson, supra note 7, at 161. Regulation of surrogacy, such 
as in the manner suggested here, would operate similarly to laws regulating the workplace. 
See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (OSHA regulates workplaces).  
 246. See Callman, supra note 28, at 278. 
 247. See Watson, supra note 207, at 545–46; ASRM Opinion, supra note 191, at 1839 
(noting that permitting compensated surrogacy arrangements is consistent with permitting 
paid gamete donation). 
 248. Overwhelmingly, surrogate mothers volunteer for altruistic reasons. While money 
may be a factor for some, few cite financial gain as the main reason why they volunteered. 
Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 30. Surrogates empathize with the intended parents 
and want to help them become parents. Id. Some surrogates pursue surrogacy as a way to 
improve themselves—some seek to increase self-esteem; some suffered a previous 
pregnancy-related loss and seek wholeness; some want to be pregnant again, seeking 
pregnancy, but not another child. Id. 
 249. Caster, supra note 5, at 498; Belkin, supra note 101, at B3. 
 250. Belkin, supra note 101, at B3. Surrogate Mother Program, Inc., a surrogacy 
brokerage firm, had a standard protocol that required monitoring the potential surrogates for 
half a year to ensure their fitness. Id. It is not unreasonable to believe such precautions could 
become the industry standard. 
 251. ASRM Opinion, supra note 191, at 1839 (“Payment to the gestational carriers 
should take into account 9 months of possible illness, risks to employment, burdens on other 
family members, and the like, but should not, however, create undue inducement or risks of 
exploitation or incentivize gestational carriers to lie about their own health conditions or 
family history.”). 
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financial costs, inconvenience, and time.252 
Placing the payment in an escrow account prior to the start of IVF ensures 
surrogates receive the promised compensation, protecting against exploitation.253 
Because payments must conclude within two months of the pregnancy’s end, funds 
would not be used to purchase an interest in a child.254 To assuage concerns that the 
fee is being used to buy children, compensation should be disbursed to the 
surrogate throughout the pregnancy.255 This would further support the statutory 
suggestion that compensation be based on the time spent, the inconvenience 
caused, and the costs accumulated.256 
 
D. Contractual Requirements 
 
The legislative proposals set out reasonable requirements for enforcement of 
surrogacy contracts, however enforcement should be expanded to include 
traditional surrogacy agreements. Requiring the contract be in writing is a logical 
way to protect all parties,257 and is not overly burdensome.258 Requiring the 
contract be signed by all parties259 prior to the cycle similarly protects the parties so 
that they enter the contract voluntarily and not due to guilt or coercion. Requiring 
the surrogate to choose her medical practitioners preserves her autonomy and 
privacy. The other proposed substantive requirements are unremarkable.260 
Notably, the proposals only sanction gestational surrogacy contracts.261 This 
will satisfy most intended parents, but the legislature should sanction commercial 
traditional surrogacy contracts as well. While gestational surrogacy has increased 
in popularity,262 some intended parents prefer to forgo the intended mother’s 
                                                                                                             
 
 252. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-502(a) (N.Y. 2013). This is an appropriate, albeit flexible, 
formula for calculating surrogates’ compensation. See Watson, supra note 207, at 551–52 
(“Surrogacy is a twenty-four hour per day job that lasts for nine months. The job involves 
danger to the woman’s life and health. There is no vacation time from this job, and there are 
few tangible job perks. Clearly, surrogates deserve compensation for their services.”). 
 253. ASRM Opinion, supra note 191, at 1839. Use of an escrow account also protects the 
intended parents by separating the financial incentive from their interactions with the 
surrogate. Id. 
 254. Assem. B. 6701§ 581-502(a) (N.Y. 2013). 
 255. See Caster, supra note 5, at 513. 
 256. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-502(a) (N.Y. 2013). 
 257. Requiring the contract be written is not unique to the New York proposal. See, e.g., 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(1) (2013); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-160(A) (2010). 
 258. Compare Assem. B. 6701 § 581-405(a)(1) (N.Y. 2013) with VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
160(A)-(B) (requiring a hearing on the merits of the surrogacy contract, a court-appointed 
guardian ad litem for the resulting child, and a home study for both parties before approving 
the agreement and permitting the procedures to commence). 
 259. Requiring a married surrogate’s husband to be a party to the contract avoids the 
presumption of paternity for the resulting child. This is codified in other states’ surrogacy 
laws. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(10). 
 260. For example, the proposals require the contract to clearly assign obligations to all 
parties and the parties to be independently represented. 
 261. See Assem. B. 6701 § 581-103(m)–(o) (N.Y. 2013).  
 262. See Scott, supra note 14, at 122, 139. 
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genetic connection to the child to improve their odds for a successful pregnancy.263 
Others prefer traditional surrogacy because it costs much less than gestational 
surrogacy.264 Also, conceptually, it is strange to allow egg donation for profit and 
to allow gestational surrogacy for profit but not to allow the combination of 
services. It is arbitrary to limit enforcement to gestational surrogacy contracts. 
Women willing to enter traditional surrogacy contracts are still the best judges of 
what they are able and willing to undertake.265 Enforcement of traditional 
surrogacy arrangements should be permitted under the legislative proposals. 
 
E. Legal Parentage 
 
The other major change endorsed by the proposed legislation is to permit 
“judgments of parentage” prior to birth of children born to surrogates.266 While the 
formal requirements laid out in the proposals are fairly unremarkable,267 the end 
result is not: at birth the child’s legal parents are the intended parents, who 
immediately get custody without adoption by the intended mother. 
Determining parentage under a surrogacy contract is incredibly important; it is 
unwise to enter such agreements without parentage being enforceable at the 
outset.268 Parents have a constitutionally protected interest in developing and 
maintaining relationships with their children.269 Similarly, most states guarantee 
                                                                                                             
 
 263. The miscarriage rate is higher when the carrier is not related to the embryo. See 
Caster, supra note 5, at 481.  
 264. The average cost of traditional surrogacy is $50,000, which is less than half the 
average cost of gestational surrogacy, which averages between $120,000–$140,000. See 
Surrogacy: What to Expect, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/ 
entry/surrogacy-what-to-expect.  
 265. This would however make medical examinations more important. Sperm being used 
for intrauterine insemination should be screened to protect surrogates from exposure to 
sexually transmitted diseases. See Walker, supra note 228, at 126. Further, a “special 
relationship” exists between the ART clinic and the surrogate, in which it has a duty of care 
to look out for her health and well-being. See Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 268–71 (6th Cir. 
1992).  
 266. Assemb. B. 6701 §§ 581-201(c)(ii), 203 (N.Y. 2013). 
 267. The proposals basically ensure that New York has jurisdiction over the contract, that 
the statutory eligibility and enforceability requirements are met, and that the contract was 
entered voluntarily. Id. § 581-203(b)(1)–(3).  
 268. Without the agreement being enforceable at the outset, neither the intended parents 
nor the surrogate has a guaranteed incentive, and thus will be more hesitant. Posner, supra 
note 210, at 23; CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 216. Legal and social parental status 
should be determined by the contract and its parties’ intentions at formation. Scott, supra 
note 14, at 122. If the law does not safeguard the parties’ intentions, the results can prove 
disastrous—namely, custodial disputes (or anxiety about that possibility), can lead to horrific 
consequences for the intended parents. See Scott, supra note , at 123. If parentage is not able 
to be determined before the child’s birth, peculiar things can happen. For example, a child 
could end up having no legal mother, no legal father, or no legal parents. Bonnie Steinbock, 
Defining Parenthood, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 107, 108 
(J.R. Spencer & Anteje Du Bois-Pedain, eds. 2006). 
 269. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, 
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 128 (2006) 
(referencing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)). A Utah law prohibiting surrogacy 
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children the right to legally recognized relationships with their parents.270 “By 
allowing the intended parents to be listed on their children’s birth certificates, they 
can avoid unnecessary litigation regarding parentage, custody or even intestacy 
rights.”271 Immediately listing the intended parents reflects the legal and social 
reality of parenthood, the parties’ intentions, and thus would decrease anxiety and 
uncertainty for the intended parents.272 Birth certificates are legal documents, 
maintained and created as proscribed by law; they are not governed by biology or 
genetics, so they should simply reflect legal reality.273 The law should respect the 
parties’ intentions and enforce their decisions on parental roles.  
Without the surrogacy contract, the resulting child would not exist; the child 
was intentionally conceived at the behest of the intended parents.274 That is the 
reason adoption is inadequate and inappropriate.275 This is something the 
legislative proposals recognize: where intended parents do not pursue and obtain a 
judgment of parentage under the statute, the court assigns legal parentage based on 
“the best interests of the child,”276 informed by “genetics and the intent of the 
parties.”277  
                                                                                                             
contracts was found unconstitutional because the law interfered with the biological parents’ 
“fundamental liberty interest[] in their parental relationship with their children.” J.R. v. 
Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1297 (D. Utah 2003); CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 257. 
 270. Meyer, supra note 269, at 129. 
 271. Caster, supra note 5, 494–95. 
 272. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 9, at 40. 
 273. Caster, supra note 5, at 495. Even New York’s Task Force on Life and the Law 
relatively recently recommended that the law should provide an efficient manner for 
enforcing the intent of the parties to a surrogacy contract with regards to legal parentage. 
TASK FORCE, supra note 26.  
 274. Arneson, supra note 7, at 157. It is this intent that should control. Legal- and 
biological-parentage are not equivalents, in either law or reality. TASK FORCE, supra note 26. 
For example, New York law assigns legal paternity to a woman’s husband when she is 
inseminated with another man’s sperm. Id. 
 275. The legislative scheme surrounding adoption is inappropriate to regulate parentage 
of children resulting from surrogacy. The obvious—and major—difference is that in 
adoption there already exists a child, whose birth parents have rights that need to be 
terminated. Children resulting from surrogacy only exist because of the executed agreement 
and the parental rights should vest only in the intended parents. Oftentimes, without the 
explicit direction of law, biological parents face the adoption process for their own children 
or can be unable to establish their biological/legal connection with their children. See 
CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 234. Without a legislative prescription like that described 
in the proposals, parents face a long legal process to get their names printed on their 
children’s birth certificates. Id. at 235. 
 276. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-408 (N.Y. 2013).  
 277. Id. Other outcomes may violate the Equal Protection Clause. An Arizona statute was 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause when it allowed fathers to prove paternity but 
prevented mothers from proving maternity. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 1, at 237. 
Surrogates were presumed to be the mothers of the children they birthed, while their 
husbands could be proven not to be the fathers. Id. Similarly, Maryland found that, under 
principles of Equal Protection, a woman can deny maternity, just as a man can deny 
paternity of a child. Id. at 269; In re Roberto D.B., 923 A.2d 115, 123–24 (Md. 2007). 
Interestingly, an increasing number of states permit unmarried men to challenge the 
paternity of married women’s children, even over those women’s husbands, in order to 
establish legal recognition of their biological connection. Meyer, supra note 269. Equal 
protection demands that women be afforded this same ability. 




The proposals provide that for resolving disputes and for terminating a 
surrogacy contract, “all remedies available at law or equity” are available, except 
specific performance when it requires the surrogate become pregnant,278 however 
they do not provide a framework for resolving major disputes between the intended 
parents and the surrogate: the bills are silent on what should become of the money 
or the fetus if anyone wants to terminate the agreement after embryo transfer and 
judgment of parentage. This flexibility is a double-edged sword. 
While specific performance cannot be ordered to impregnate the surrogate, 
courts could order specific performance of lifestyle clauses forcing the surrogate to 
refrain from activities that could negatively impact the fetus (such as drinking, 
smoking, or using drugs), or to engage in behavior that could positively impact the 
fetus (such as eating better, taking prenatal vitamins, or taking folic acid).279 
Despite, or even because, the intended parents pledge to accept all children 
regardless of “mental or physical condition” resulting from the arrangement, many 
contracts will provide an obligation for the surrogate to undergo prenatal testing 
and to abort if the intended parents determine the fetus has an abnormality they find 
unacceptable.280 Enforceability of such a clause is questionable under Roe v. 
Wade,281 however, refusal to comply could still lead to litigation, 282 as it is possible 
neither surrogate nor intended parents would want the offspring.283 Another 
possibility would be that the intended parents would be willing to parent, but would 
seek damages from the surrogate.284  
This silence may be intended to provide courts with the most flexibility 
permissible. With this flexibility, courts are able to adjudicate more equitably, 
especially as they are not bound by precedent.285 However, intended parents would 
likely be more comfortable knowing that their investment would be protected if the 
agreement went irreparably sour.286 While many parties to surrogacy arrangements 
may benefit from flexible regulation, more thorough legislative guidance would 
better protect their interests. 
                                                                                                             
 
 278. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-409(a)–(c) (N.Y. 2013). 
 279. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 129. 
 280. Id. at 117.  
 281. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (explaining that the right to privacy ensures that the 
decision to undergo an abortion is made by the pregnant woman). 
 282. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN (Mar. 6, 
2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/surrogacy-kelley-legal-battle/index.html 
(describing circumstances where, despite the surrogate contract requiring “abortion in case 
of severe fetus abnormality,” the surrogate refused to abort a fetus with abnormalities).  
 283. BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 26, at 117 (describing two cases where children 
resulting from surrogacy agreements were rejected by both the intended parents and the 
surrogate because of congenital problems). 
 284. See id. at 129.  
 285. Assem. B. 6701 § 581-410 (N.Y. 2013) (requiring all “proceedings, records, and 
identities of the individual parties” be sealed unless petitioned by the parties or the resulting 
child). 
 286. Notably, less than one percent of surrogacy contracts end in dispute. John Dwight 
Ingram, Surrogate Gestator: A New and Honorable Profession, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 675, 689 
(1993). 




After over twenty years of status quo, the New York Legislature has an 
opportunity to liberalize its surrogacy laws whether during this legislative session 
or the next. By adopting the proposals with the suggested changes, the Legislature 
would simultaneously bring the law into conformity with the desires of many New 
Yorkers and recognize important technological developments. The proposals are 
marked improvements on the present prohibitory regime; however, they are not 
perfect. The legislature should consider further protections for the parties to 
surrogacy arrangements and amend the proposals accordingly. The legislature’s 
renewed interest in the topic is refreshing; this interest should lead to major 
legislative overhaul in the near future. 
